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IAC-D-57/29
10 April 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56:

Probable Developments in Burma,

dated 10 April 1956

I. Findings

1. The most important intelligence deficiencies noted in the preparation of NIE 61-56 affect our ability to assess the reaction of Burma to current Bloc tactics. In some cases these deficiencies, involving attitudes and psychological reactions, cannot be overcome by increased collection or analysis. However, we believe that a

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2. Although not critical to the present estimate, we lack detailed and accurate information on:

- a. Insurgent strength
- b. Plans, organization, training, and equipment of the army
- c. The BCP and the BWPP and the relations between them
- d. The impact of present Bloc tactics and propaganda on the morale of the Burmese Communist movement

II. Action

It is requested that the appropriate IAC agencies continue their efforts to overcome the deficiencies noted above.

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